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Psychological experiment [Psychologisk experiment; 
experimenterende psykologi] 
 
The Danish ‘experiment’ (old spelling) is derived from Latin 
(experimentum: a trial, proof, test; experīrī: to try, prove, put to the 
test); ‘psykologi’ is a combination of ancient Greek (psuché: the 
source of movement in man and other living creatures) and post-
classical Latin (logica: science, discipline).1 For Kierkegaard the 
‘psychological experiment’ or ‘imaginary psychological 
construction’ is a performative strategy. It enables him to dramatize 
an existential conflict in an experimental mode.2 Kierkegaard’s aim 
is to study the source of movement that animates the existing 
individual (this is the psychological part). However, he is not 
interested in the representation of historical individuals in actual 
situations, but in the construction of fictional characters that are 
placed in hypothetical situations; this allows him to set the 
categories in motion “in order to observe completely undisturbed 
what these require”3 without caring to what extent someone has met 
this requirement or is able to meet it (this is the experimental part). 
 The ‘psychological experiment’ is a category of indirect 
communication that is developed most extensively by Frater 
Taciturnus, the pseudonymous author of the third part of Stages on 
Life’s Way. (I) Taciturnus introduces the psychological experiment 
as a new trajectory in modern literature that offers an alternative to 
poetry and speculative drama. He develops this new trajectory in 
                                                          
1 Cf. Ordbog over det Danske Sprog online, eksperiment, psykologi; OED online, 
experiment, psyche, psychology. 
2 The Danish ‘experiment’ has the same root as its English equivalent. However, in their 
translation of Kierkegaard’s works, the Hong’s have chosen to use the notion ‘imaginary 
construction’ instead of ‘experiment’ (see R, xxi-xxxi; 357-62 for their explanation of this 
choice). Other English translations, which I follow, favor ‘experiment’ (e.g. CUPH, 262; 
KJN 2, 220, 242). 
3 SKS 6, 431 / SLW, 467. 
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praxis (in the novella ‘“Guilty?”/“Not Guilty?” A Story of Suffering: 
A Psychological Experiment by Frater Taciturnus’)4 as well as in 
theory (in the ‘Letter to the Reader’ that accompanies his novella).5 
(II) Two other pseudonymous authors further enrich the conceptual 
field of the psychological experiment.6 Constantin Constantius 
develops the notion ‘experimenting psychology’;7 Johannes 




I. Frater Taciturnus and the psychological experiment as a new 
trajectory in modern literature 
 
Within the complex and multilayered text of Frater Taciturnus’s 
‘Letter to the Reader’ a new theory of literature emerges that is 
suggested rather than explicated. Taciturnus introduces the 
psychological experiment as an alternative for two trajectories in 
modern literature: poetry (e.g. Shakespeare) and speculative drama 
(e.g. J. L. Heiberg). All three trajectories—poetry, speculative drama 
and the psychological experiment—deal with existential passions 
which are made visible by creating a contradiction between the 
ideality and the actuality of a character. However, they 
fundamentally differ in the way this is done. (1) In poetry, an 
absolute passion is posited that leads to an irreconcilable 
contradiction between ideality and actuality. This contradiction is 
either essentially comic or essentially tragic, but never both at the 
same time. (2) In speculative drama, the contradiction is just a 
moment in a larger development. Therefore, only a relative passion 
is posited and neither the comic nor the tragic can properly take 
hold of the situation. (3) In the psychological experiment, a new 
kind of absolute passion is posited: the religious. This religious 
passion complicates the contradiction between actuality and ideality 
                                                          
4 SKS 6, 173-368 / SLW, 185-397.  
5 SKS 6, 369-454 / SLW, 398-494. See also Taciturnus’s letter in Fædrelandet (SKS 14, 79-
84/ COR, 38-46). 
6 A third and a fourth pseudonym could be added: Petrus Minor (Pap. VII² B 235 14-6 / 
BA, 15-7) and Vigilius Haufniensis (SKS 6, 147-148 / CA, 54-56). 
7 The notion ‘experimenting psychology’ appears in the subtitle of Repetition, but is not 
mentioned anywhere else in the book. Constantius develops this notion in an unpublished 
reply to J. L. Heiberg’s review of Repetition (Pap. IV B 110-1, 116-7 / R 283-323). 
8 Climacus hints at another, more philosophical conception of the experiment (e.g. SKS 7, 
188 / CUP1, 206-7), but also reflects on the psychological experiment as developed by 
Constantius and Taciturnus (cf. SKS 7, 239-40; 263-5; 453/ CUP1, 263-4; 288-91; 500-1). 
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in such a way that this contradiction becomes simultaneously 
essentially comic and essentially tragic. 
(1) Poetry. In the first trajectory, the misrelation between 
ideality and actuality is expressed either as a tragic or as a comic 
contradiction. Taciturnus does not say much about the comic. 
However, from his few remarks it can be deduced that the comic 
expresses disbelief in the hero’s ideality and incites laughter.9 When 
a girl declares that she is willing to die for her beloved (ideality) but 
leaves him as soon as she learns that he only has four toes on his 
left foot (actuality), she becomes ludicrous. The girl’s ideality is 
exposed by the actual circumstances in which she is placed. The 
tragic contradiction, by contrast, expresses belief in the ideality of 
the hero and incites sympathy. Taciturnus gives the example of 
Romeo and Juliet; they love each other with absolute passion, but a 
family feud comes between them and makes them unhappy.10 In 
poetry, the tragic depiction of such an unhappy love has two 
characteristics. First, the lovers do not have the power to overcome 
the contradiction. Second, the contradiction is determined by 
external circumstances (i.e. fate, chance) and not by the lovers own 
relation to the ideality of love. 
(2) Speculative drama. Taciturnus finds a second trajectory 
in speculative drama.11 Speculative drama expresses the 
contradiction between ideality and actuality in such a way that it is 
neither comic nor tragic, but becomes a relative moment in a 
dialectical development. The speculative hero does not discover love 
as an absolute passion that is given, but as a possibility that still 
needs to be actualized in reality. For him, “there is no assurance 
that the outcome will be happy if only the external obstacles will be 
cleared away”.12 Unhappy love becomes a temporal contradiction 
which holds no lasting power over the speculative hero. Instead of 
despairing over the contradiction, as Romeo does when he poisons 
himself, the speculative hero overcomes it and moves on to a new 
love affair. “So,” Taciturnus writes, “while one almost never hears 
mention of an unhappy lover, there is all the more competition 
about having been one, even more than once have suffered what 
these unhappy ones suffer, but also having overcome these 
                                                          
9 Cf. SKS 6, 391, 405 / SLW, 420, 437; Pap. V B 148: 17 / SLW, 633; Pap. V B 150: 17 / 
SLW, 633-4. 
10 SKS 6, 378 / SLW, 407. 
11 SKS 6, 382 / SLW, 412. 
12 SKS 6, 380 /SLW, 409. 
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sufferings etc. etc. etc.”13 Speculative drama reduces the ideality of 
love to a “more or less happy love”14 that is one kind of beer for 
everyone. Therefore, the contradiction is neither comic nor tragic. 
In the eyes of Frater Taciturnus, speculative drama lacks a sense of 
the infinite; it rejects the absolute passion of poetry, but does not 
posit a higher passion that saves it from mediocrity. “If poetry is to 
continue to exist,” he argues, “it must discover another passion, one 
just as legitimate as love was for poetry.”15 
(3) The psychological experiment. Taciturnus develops the 
psychological experiment as an alternative for poetry and 
speculative drama. (a) The psychological experiment posits a new 
kind of passion: the religious. (b) The religious demands a higher 
ideality that does not precede the actuality it contradicts, but is an 
act of freedom that comes after it. (c) To satisfy the demand of the 
religious, the individual has to make a double movement. (d) In the 
psychological experiment only the first of these movements is made 
by dramatizing an unresolved existential conflict in a series of 
contradictions that are simultaneously comic and tragic. (e) Only 
the affected reader—who undergoes a catharsis in the process—can 
make the second movement. 
(a) The religious. Taciturnus discovers this passion, not as 
something he has realized himself but only as a possibility that 
comes to the fore in the character he has “conjured up”: Quidam 
(somebody). This Quidam is characterized as “a demoniac character 
in the direction of the religious—that is, tending toward it”.16 
According to Taciturnus, the religious consists “in being infinitely 
concerned about oneself and consequently not deeming oneself 
finished”.17 This infinite concern for oneself is not the same as 
egotism, because it places the individual in a relationship to God. It 
is important to emphasize that God is here not understood as a 
unifying ground on the basis of which the individual can 
understand his life as a progressive movement towards self-
realization. On the contrary, God signifies a loss of grounding. The 
religious passion confronts the individual with something ‘other’ 
that underlies his own relation to himself, but that will always 
escape his grasp. In poetry this transcendental element is also 
                                                          
13 SKS 6, 379 /SLW, 408. 
14 SKS 6, 379 /SLW, 409. 
15 SKS 6, 380 /SLW, 410. 
16 SKS 6, 309 / SLW, 398. 
17 SKS 6, 448 / SLW, 486. 
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discovered, but there it is determined as coming from outside, as 
something that happens to the individual (fate, chance). The 
religious passion forces the individual to acknowledge that this 
ungraspable ‘other’ is part of his own constitution as a self; 
therefore, it can no longer be perceived as something external. 
(b) Ideality as an act of freedom. The religious passion is just 
as absolute as the passion of love that animates poetry. In both cases 
the passion constitutes an ideality that is higher than actuality. 
However, for the religious passion the ideality is not an abstract 
given that precedes actuality (as in poetry), but a concrete action 
that comes after actuality. “This ideality, therefore, is not an illusory 
anticipation that still has not seen the actuality but is an act of 
freedom after the actuality.”18 In the psychological experiment, 
ideality is neither given as an absolute ground (poetry), nor won as 
a relative result (speculative drama). Instead, it is an act of freedom 
that places the source of movement within the existing individual. 
(c) The double movement of inwardness. Taciturnus suggests 
that this act of freedom ‘after the actuality’ is the outcome of a 
double movement that has to be made to constitute inwardness. (i) 
An idealizing movement that turns the outer actuality into an inner 
possibility. In this idealizing movement the raw data of outer 
actuality are transformed to the qualitative opposites of inner 
ideality (e.g. guilty?/not guilty?) and appropriated as existential 
possibilities.19 This makes the individual free from the purely 
accidental in outer actuality. (ii) An actualizing movement that 
turns the appropriated possibility into an actualized inwardness. In 
this second movement the individual chooses himself by linking the 
idea (e.g. guilt) to his own existence and taking it up as his task.20 
This makes him free from the abstract indefiniteness of possibility. 
Taciturnus describes this double movement of inwardness as a 
“negative infinity”.21 This simply means that this double movement 
will never be concluded in a positive result (at least not in time), 
given that “first of all, the result lies in the internal and, second, is 
continually postponed”.22 The result lies in the internal because it is 
not the outcome of a continuous process of development, but is 
determined by a rupture: the choice of the individual. The result is 
                                                          
18 SKS 6, 391 / SLW, 422. 
19 SKS 6, 406 / SLW, 439; Pap. V B 148:17 / SLW, 633. 
20 Ibid. 
21 SKS 6, 411; 448 / SLW, 444; 486. 
22 SKS 6, 408 / SLW, 442. 
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continually postponed because the choice only holds true for the 
moment in which it is taken. The individual remains unfinished 
and ungrounded and, therefore, has to choose himself over and 
over again. 
(d) The dramatization of an existential conflict. The literary 
artist cannot give a static representation of the double movement of 
inwardness, but somehow has to activate the reader to make this 
double movement for himself. In Taciturnus’s psychological 
experiment, the character—Quidam—only makes the first movement 
and discovers the qualitative opposites of ideality (love/ no love; 
guilty/not guilty). However, he fails to complete the second 
movement that links his own existence to the idea. Instead of 
choosing himself in the idea, Quidam let the circumstances decide 
if the idea is present or not and, therefore, he “enters into dialectical 
agony”.23 The dialectical agony is not represented as fixed state, but 
dramatized as an unresolved existential conflict. This dramatization 
does not decide if the ideality of the character is to be believed or 
not, but expresses both possibilities. In this way, a “dialectically 
infinitized spirit”24 will simultaneously see both the comic and the 
tragic in the same situation. This duplexity makes clear that the 
circumstances cannot decide if the idea is present or not; only the 
existing individual can decide this. 
 (e) Catharsis. Both poetry and the psychological experiment 
are indirect forms of communication that presuppose “an ability to 
be affected on the part of the spectator”.25 In both cases this ability 
to be affected is assisted by awakening fear and compassion. 
However, poetry aims to take away “the egotism in the affected 
spectator in such a way that he loses himself in the hero’s suffering, 
forgetting himself in him”.26 In contrast, the religious passion gives 
a new twist to this notion of catharsis. From a religious perspective 
“fear and compassion are something different and are purified not 
by turning outward but by turning inward”.27 The psychological 
experiment aims to let the outer world vanish in such a way that the 
reader becomes infinitely concerned about himself as an existing 
individual. 
  
                                                          
23 SKS 6, 416 / SLW, 451. 
24 SKS 6, 391/ SLW, 420. 
25 SKS 6, 425 / SLW, 460. 
26 Ibid. 
27 SKS 6, 359 / SLW, 462. 
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II. Constantius and Climacus on the psychological experiment 
 
Both Constantin Constantius and Johannes Climacus see the 
psychological experiment as a way to deal with the existential 
difficulty that the inner is not the outer. (1) Constantius develops 
an experimenting psychology to activate the inwardness of the 
reader, without defining it in any way. (2) Climacus reflects on the 
psychological experiment as a way to make the reader contemporary 
with the character. 
(1) Experimenting psychology. The central theme of 
Constantius’s Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting Psychology, 
is motion or movement. Constantius follows Aristotle’s definition 
of movement [kinesis] as “the transition from possibility to 
actuality”28. According to him, this transition must be understood 
as a repetition in the sphere of freedom (individual existence) rather 
than as a mediation in the sphere of logic (general knowledge). For 
that reason, Constantius has to make sure that the reader does not 
relate himself contemplatively to the existential categories, but in 
freedom. To this end, Constantius develops a new writing strategy, 
which he calls ‘experimenting psychology’ or ‘imaginatively 
constructing psychology’.29 The aim of this writing strategy is to 
activate the reader in such a way that he finds the source of the 
movement within himself and is forced to become an active creator. 
Constantius creates this effect by imaginatively constructing 
individualities and situations that approximate actuality without 
ever reaching it. “I wanted,” Constantius writes “to depict and make 
visible psychologically and esthetically; in the Greek sense, I wanted 
to let the concept come into being in the individuality and the 
situation, working itself forward through all sorts of 
misunderstandings.”30 These misunderstandings conceal the main 
idea “in order to exclude the heretics from understanding the 
book”.31 Such heretics are figures of half-truth who are not able to 
distinguish between jest and earnestness. To deceive these heretics, 
Constantius turns his text into a riddle that can only be made 
fruitful by an existing individual who is able, first, to identify the 
confusions and, second, to develop the emerging existential category 
on his own. In this way, repetition—as the source of movement 
                                                          
28 Pap. IV B 117 290 / R, 310. 
29 In their translation, the Hong’s use both alternatives (e.g. R, 125; 311). 
30 Pap. IV B 117 282 / R, 302. 
31 Pap. IV B 111 274 / R, 298. 
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within the individual himself—becomes “a task for freedom”32 that 
has to be taken up by the reader. “Only, in freedom’s relation to the 
task of freedom is there earnestness”33, the rest is jest. 
(2) Making the reader a contemporary. In Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, Johannes Climacus characterizes the 
psychological experiment as a performative strategy that makes the 
reader “contemporary [samtidig] with the existing person in his 
existence”. This effect is achieved by employing “linear measures 
approximating actuality rather than the foreshortened 
perspective”.34 In this rather enigmatic description, Climacus creates 
an opposition between what we could call ‘representations after the 
fact’ and his own psychological experiment. Representations after 
the fact create the illusion of actuality with the help of a distortive 
technique (the foreshortened perspective). Psychological 
experiments, on the other hand, make the reader contemporary with 
the character by confronting him with an undecided existential 
conflict that approximates actuality, but never reaches it (i.e. linear 
measures). This existential conflict is not depicted as something real 
that has already happened, but is invoked as a series of possibilities 
that still have to be decided. In another passage Climacus 
formulates this as follows: “the imaginary construction [the 
experiment] does not take as its starting point a later moment in 
time and relate a remarkable conflict as something past, nor does it 
slacken the conflict in a reassuring conclusion, but by means of its 
teasing form makes the reader even more contemporary that he is 
able to become by way of a contemporary actuality and leaves him 
stuck in it by not giving a conclusion”.35 For Climacus, the 
difference between a representation after the fact and a 
psychological experiment is that the former communicates a result 
that is already decided whereas the latter creates a performative 
effect by making the reader contemporary with the character in real 
time and burdening him with an existential problem. 
 
See also: authorship; comic, the/comedy; movement, motion; psychology; 
religious, the/religiousness; tragic, the/tragedy 
 
Martijn Boven 
                                                          
32 Pap. IV B 111 293 / R, 312. 
33 Pap. IV B 111 268 / R, 292; Pap. IV B 117 287 / R, 306. 
34 SKS 7, 453 / CUP1, 501 (translation altered). 
35 SKS 7, 263 / CUP1, 289. 
